Why Do African Countries Adopt IFRS? An Institutional Perspective by Boolaky, Pran K et al.
1 
 
Why Do African Countries Adopt IFRS? An Institutional Perspective. 
Pran K. Boolaky, Vincent Tawiah and Teerooven Soobaroyen  
Abstract 
We examine the institutional drivers of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
adoption in Africa. The study covers all 54 African countries and relies on data from 2010 to 
2015. Our results support the neo-institutional theoretical predictions that coercive, mimetic, 
and normative isomorphism influence IFRS adoption in Africa, although the circuits of 
isomorphic pressures differ from previous studies investigating adoption at the worldwide level 
and in emerging economies. Specifically, we find evidence of the influence by the World Bank 
(WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) on African countries made subject to the Report 
on Observance of Standard and Codes (ROSC) Accounting and Auditing program of 
assessment. We also found that the presence of global audit firms and the number of years of 
IFAC membership are strongly associated with a country’s decision to adopt IFRS. Also, 
countries with a more structured and active professional accounting organization are more 
likely to adopt IFRS. Our findings provide insights into the significant role played by local 
professional accounting organizations in the promotion of IFRS. Furthermore, our study adds 
to the literature by providing empirical evidence that the nature of the isomorphic pressures in 
Africa are different from those suggested in prior studies and reinforces the view that IFRS 
adoption is primarily driven by social and political dimensions rather than the economic ones 
usually professed by IFRS proponents.  
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Over the last few decades, the African continent has become more globally connected through 
foreign investments and trade. For example, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa increased 
from US $ 14 billion in 2004 to US $ 73 billion in 2014, and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
grew by 17% over the same period (PWC, 2017). One factor purportedly attributed to the rise 
of foreign investment and trade is the availability of financial accounting information to 
underpin the decisions by investors and international suppliers/customers (Nnadi and 
Soobaroyen, 2015). Specifically, and over the last twenty years, IFRS diffusion has been 
characterized as a global endeavor to harmonize disparate accounting practices mandated in 
local standards and hence facilitate the global flow of investment and trade (Chua and Taylor, 
2008; Alon and Dwyer, 2014). At the global level, 65% of countries have adopted IFRS. 
Contrastingly, as of 2015, only one-third of African countries adopted IFRS in its fully-fledged 
form (18 out of 55 countries) and 48% of the countries on the continent use local accounting 
standards. This brings to the fore the question of what factors might be associated with the 
decision to adopt (or not) IFRS.  Consequently, this paper aims to provide insights into the 
factors that are associated with IFRS adoption in Africa.  
Following Judge, Li Pinsker (2010) and other work examining the dynamics of IFRS adoption 
(e.g. Alon and Dwyer, 2014; Hassan, Rankin and Lu, 2014; Nurunnabi, 2015), the paper draws 
from neo-institutional theory. According to this perspective, nation-states are conceptualized 
as social actors that seek legitimacy and social acceptability, and as such, they are subject to 
transnational, international and national forces (or constraints). These forces (or constraints) 
bring about a wide array of pressures that shift countries towards the adoption of similar 
practices (i.e. isomorphism) within a given institutionalized environment of global norms, 
customs and rules of governance (Chua and Taylor, 2008; Alon and Dywer, 2014, Nurunnabi, 
2015; Hopper, Lassou and Soobaroyen, 2017). Conceptually, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
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classify isomorphism into coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. In this context, coercive 
isomorphism emanates from a financial dependency and other conditions associated to support 
from donor nations or international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is measured as the total commitment from foreign 
donors and the nature of recommendations from their Reports on Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC) relating to a given country (Chua and Taylor, 2008). Mimetic isomorphism 
arises from the replication of practices across nations whereby there is tendency to emulate 
what more successful countries have done to secure benefits and social acceptance (Nurunnabi, 
2005), often as a result of initiatives championed by national ‘enabling’ organizations that are 
affiliated to international IFRS ‘champions’ (Chua and Taylor, 2008). This was measured as 
the number of years the country has been a member of the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) and the number of international audit firms operating in the country. 
Lastly, normative isomorphism refers to the role and influence of professionalization processes 
led by local bodies and/or institutions (e.g. universities, regulators) that establish what is 
required of a qualified accountant (Hassan et al., 2014). This is measured by the number of 
qualified accountants and the strength/level of structuring of the professional accounting 
organization (PAO). Drawing from prior findings on IFRS adoption (Judge et al. 2010; Ben 
Othman and Kossentini, 2015), we controlled for import penetration, growth rate of gross 
domestic product, prevalence of foreign ownership, market capitalization and colonial history.  
As of 2015, only 18 African countries have mandated IFRS for all listed and large companies, 
whereas 6 countries require some companies to use IFRS. Only 5 countries allow voluntary 
adoption but 25 countries have not committed to the use of IFRS. Coercive, mimetic, and 
normative pressures are found to be associated with IFRS adoption in Africa, albeit that the 
‘circuits’ of pressure differ from prior studies (e.g. Judge et al. 2010). In particular, our results 
show IFRS adoption in countries where the WB/IMF recommended IFRS adoption (in their 
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ROSC reports) and where there were more global audit firms. Countries having longer IFAC 
membership and stronger PAO are also more likely to adopt IFRS. As a robustness test, a firm-
level analysis reveals that African companies that voluntarily adopted IFRS have a larger 
number of chartered accountants on the board and have been audited by one of the Big Four 
firms. The results are robust when considering alternative measures and econometric models. 
Our findings contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, we complement the cross-
national insights by Judge et al. (2010), Koning et al., (2018) and Ben Othman and Kossentini, 
(2015) by emphasizing the incremental socio-political, rather than purely economic, 
dimensions of the determinants of IFRS adoption in Africa associated to both transnational and 
national sources. These prior studies highlighted foreign aid, import penetration, trade freedom, 
and secondary school education. However, IFRS adoption in Africa seems to be predicated on 
the existence of coercive pressures from IMF/World bank, mimetic pressures via IFAC 
membership and normative pressure from the strength of PAOs. These findings chime with 
some of the few single-country case studies (e.g. Hassan et al., 2014; Nurunnabi, 2015). 
Secondly, our results bring to the fore the regional specificities as to the nature and type of 
pressure underlying IFRS adoption and hence strengthen calls for studies that can capture the 
unique features and dynamics of accounting practices in Africa (Rahaman, 2010; Lassou and 
Hopper, 2016). This also raises questions about the monolithic use of generalized proxies and 
assumptions that consider institutional frameworks in Africa to be similar to other regions.  
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 reviews the literature; 
Section 3 sets out the theory and hypotheses development; Section 4 describes the research 




2.0. Literature review 
2.1. Empirical literature on the institutional determinants of IFRS. 
In relation to the determinants of IFRS adoption, Judge et al. (2010) examined the relevance of 
isomorphic pressures for a sample of 132 countries and found that foreign aid, import 
penetration, and educational attainment, are respectively and significantly coercive, mimetic 
and normative predictors of a country’s decision to adopt IFRS. A crucial point by the authors 
is that these factors are observed to be more significantly associated to a country’s level of 
IFRS adoption compared to the ‘traditional’ legal and cultural variables used by Ding, Jeanjean, 
and Stolowy (2005) and Hope and Kang (2006). These factors are rooted in historical, and 
arguably increasingly less relevant, circumstances. Notwithstanding evidence of an existing 
debate about whether weak investor protection rules/legal origin ‘outweigh’ cultural 
dimensions (refer to Hope and Kang 2005; Ding et al., 2005) as factors influencing IFRS 
adoption, Judge et al (2010) revealed that normative isomorphism (educational attainment) has 
the strongest influence on IFRS adoption.  Judge et al. (2010) argued that the peculiarity of this 
result may be related to an observation that the accounting profession is more susceptible to 
normative pressures relative to other institutional norms “because professional norms and 
practices are supposed to transcend national beliefs and common practices.” (p. 169).  Whilst 
the authors do offer some anecdotal evidence (US/Japan), there is a scope to investigate 
whether there is a normative ‘circuit of professional influence’ by relying on more specific 
measures of country-level accounting professionalization.   
At the same time, and partially in response to Chua and Taylor’s (2008) calls to study 
the international diffusion of IFRS and Judge et al.’s (2010) findings, several studies sought to 
investigate the dynamics of how and why does IFRS disseminate in developed as well as 
developing countries. Alon and Dywer (2014) study the specific case of early adoption by a 
6 
 
sample of 71 countries and inferred that countries with weaker governing structures and lower 
level of economic development tend to adopt IFRS earlier because of a presumed need for 
legitimacy and resources from international financial institutions (e.g. WB & IMF). However, 
the authors do not directly measure the extent of such a dependence towards these institutions. 
Koning et al. (2018) also assessed the transnational drivers of IFRS adoption in a large sample 
of 168 countries and found that IFRS adoption is not influenced by local determinants but by 
the policy diffusion forces of learning, competition, and emulation among countries. Hence, 
countries tend to adopt IFRS through learning or competing with an IFRS-adopted country and 
there is little evidence of a coercive effect (e.g. from international financial institutions). 
Although the results largely support the neo-institutional perspective, we contend that their 
findings might be more relevant to the case of developed countries that already have established 
local settings, such as professional accounting organizations, regulatory framework for 
accounting and auditing services, presence of large international accounting firms in addition 
to a well-developed accounting education system (academically and/or professionally).  
Contrastingly the case may be different in developing countries due to the absence of 
strong local institutional structures and IFRS may not be diffused in the same way as argued 
by Koning et al. (2018). In this regard, local factors, as argued by Ball (2006) and Alon and 
Dwyer (2014), may predominate. For instance, IFRS adoption may be associated to the state 
of national institutions irrespective of what neighboring countries have decided i.e. whilst there 
may be an interest towards learning, competition, and emulation, national institutional 
structures may not be necessarily equipped (or be well developed) to do so (refer to Hopper et 
al., 2017). Thus, local factors, such as the influence of the national professional accounting 
organizations (PAOs) and professional accountants, may remain the driving force behind IFRS 
adoption in developing countries. Notwithstanding, an early study by Zeghal and Mhedhbi 
(2006) revealed a significant positive association between educational levels, the existence of 
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a capital market, and cultural closeness to Anglo–American culture, and a country’s IFRS 
adoption decision, thereby highlighting the relevance of a combination of economic and 
cultural variables. It is acknowledged that the extent of IFRS adoption amongst 
developing/emerging economies at the time of the study was not so prevalent and inherently 
excluded many African countries.  
In this regard, Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) rely on a larger sample of 50 
emerging economies (including nine African countries) by also relying on neo-institutional 
theory. They used foreign aid and the use of ROSC reports as a proxy for coercive 
isomorphism, trade freedom, and the density of the Big Four auditing firm offices as mimetic 
isomorphism variables, and IFAC membership and the number of certified public accountants 
(CPA) per population as normative proxies. Their study revealed that both coercive and 
mimetic isomorphism are significant and are positively associated with a country’s IFRS 
adoption decision. Consistent with Ritsumeikan (2011), Judge et al. (2010), Boolaky (2012), 
and Albu et al. (2011), Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) find support for the coercive and 
mimetic nature of the institutional pressures on IFRS adoption in emerging economies. At the 
same time, Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) reported a significant negative association 
between normative isomorphism and IFRS adoption, implying that the higher the number of 
accounting professionals in an emerging country, the less likely a country will to adopt IFRS. 
The authors inferred that for countries that faced a lack of qualified professional accountants 
are more likely to adopt IFRS due to the limited capacity to develop their own national 
standards. Ritsumeikan (2011) attempted to apply Judge et al.’s (2010) model to the case of 
emerging economies and found a stronger association for coercive isomorphism, albeit that the 
results appear to be influenced by the weak proxies for the mimetic and normative dimensions.   
Whilst these results highlight the specificities of developing/emerging countries in 
relation to IFRS adoption, the findings remain mixed in terms of the relevance of various 
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pressures and factors. The role of transnational institutions, as a coercive pressure, has been 
alluded to in several single-country studies (e.g. Romani - Albu et al., 2011; Iraq – Hassan et 
al., 2014; Bangladesh - Nurunnabi, 2015), and merits further analysis; particularly with 
reference to the African context.  
2.2. Empirical literature on IFRS adoption in Africa 
 A few studies have assessed the adoption and development of accounting standards in 
Africa, and have predominately examined the development of accounting or consequence of 
IFRS in a particular country or regional setting. For example, Assesnso-Okofo, Ali and Ahmed 
(2011) documented that both institutional and political pressures significantly influenced the 
transition of local accounting standards towards IFRS in Ghana, but the regulatory environment 
to enforce it is fragile. In a similar vein, Bova and Pereira (2012) found that institutional 
structures, such as the type of corporate ownership, shaped the adoption, compliance, and 
consequences of IFRS in Kenya. Stainbank (2014) investigated the case of 32 African countries 
and identified a number of economic motivations (faster economic growth rates, market 
capitalization) underlying IFRS adoption, in addition to the observation that countries having 
cultural ties with the United Kingdom (as ex-British colonies) were more likely to adopt IFRS.  
The above results do highlight the continued relevance of colonial influence in Africa, 
although it is not always clear how this influence is enacted or persists post-independence. In 
spite of a number of internal and external pressures, the accounting structures of most African 
Francophone countries are, for instance, still shaped by the long-established traditions and 
advisers directly from their ex-colonizer, France (Elad, 2015). In particular, Degos et al. (2018) 
argue that African French-speaking countries followed a different path to English-speaking 
countries in their relatively slow progress towards full IFRS adoption and convergence. They 
identified a number of inter-related factors namely the continued interaction/influence of 
French institutions on the development of local accounting standards, the academic and 
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professional accounting educational structures and the role of key consultants/actors in the 
field. 
 Lastly, some single-country studies in Africa do emphasize the direct lobbying efforts 
from international financial institutions with respect to IFRS adoption, particularly in the 
context of the WB and/or the IMF’s interventions on structural adjustment and assistance 
programs (Rahaman, 2010; Hopper et al. 2017). For example, Hassan (2008) highlighted that 
foreign aid provided by the IMF had been a key influential conduit through which Egypt was 
pressured to move towards IFRS. More recently, Zori (2015) reported that the adoption of IFRS 
in Nigeria was a core component of WB-funded Economic Recovery and Governance 
Programme (ERGP) instigated by international institutions in return for financial assistance. 
Alongside other similar cases in the developing world (Hassan et al., 2014; Nurunnabi, 2015) 
and observations that a number of transnational governance bodies (e.g. Financial Stability 
Board,  European Union, International Organisation of Securities Commissions) have become 
more vocal in their support for the adoption of, or convergence to, common accounting, 
auditing and governance standards (Alon and Dywer, 2014), we contend that there is a need to 
investigate more generally the extent of the influence of transnational players on IFRS adoption 
in Africa.    
3.Theory and hypothesis development 
3.1. Background of neo-institutional theory 
Neo-institutional theory remains one of the most commonly used theoretical 
perspectives in analysing how organizations embed rules, beliefs, and cultural norms 
(Lounsbury and Zhao, 2013). According to this theory, institutions or organizations themselves 
are actors who facilitate growing similarities within a particular field (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). Although the neo-institutional perspective is primarily drawn from cognitive and social 
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psychology, anthropology and political science, it has been applied in other areas including 
management and accounting. Prior studies have used the neo-institutional perspective to 
establish the nature of internal and external institutional pressures driving the adoption of 
particular regulations and practices (Tauron, 2005). For example, Guler, Guillen, and 
Macpherson (2002) posited that the adoption of ISO 9000 standards was influenced by 
institutional factors, as was the case for hostile takeover legislation and practices (Schneper 
and Guillen, 2004).   
The development of accounting standards and its adoption (at national and 
organizational levels) also follow a similar trend (Mueller, Gernon, and Meek, 1994). 
Rodrigues and Craig (2007) define institutionalization in the global accounting context as the 
social process through which countries accept that their local standards need to be replaced by 
international standards, ostensibly to achieve a global harmonization of accounting practices 
and standards. Early scholars, who examined the process of harmonization of accounting 
standards, revealed that country-specific characteristics such as legal, cultural, economic, 
historical and political features do, to a varying extent, influence a country’s decision to adopt 
or not a new accounting practice or system (Ding et al., 2005; Hope et al., 2006; Boolaky and 
Soobaroyen, 2017; Archambault and Archambault 2009; Zarzeski 1996). However, these 
dimensions often reflect structural conditions within a jurisdiction and offer only limited, and 
sometimes contradictory explanations. Instead, what is needed is a better understanding of the 
contemporary and dynamic forces behind what has been labelled as an unusually fast rate of 
IFRS adoption worldwide (Chua and Taylor, 2008; Judge et al., 2010; Alon and Dywer, 2014).    
We thus contend that a key assumption underlying the neo-institutional perspective is 
that participants seek legitimacy from the prevailing institutional environment by conforming 
to particular standards of behaviour that are themselves seen to be appropriate and socially 
acceptable (Judge et al., 2010; Alon and Dywer, 2014). In turn, the maintenance or gain in 
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legitimacy provides participants with benefits, access to resources and ensure survival.  Scott 
(1987) also conceptualized an institutional environment as a sustainable system of socially 
organized practices and social benefits associated with different functional areas of the society. 
Following this concept of institution and his prior studies on institutionalism, Scott (2001), 
presents a three-level theoretical framework which elaborates how the higher institutional 
environment affects lower institutions. Consistent with previous institutional theory insights 
relating to the diffusion of IFRS at the national level (e.g. Judge et al., 2010; Alon and Dywer, 
2014), the top-tier institutional environment consists of number of transnational and other 
societal bodies (e.g. WB, IMF) who use both formal and informal communications, 
recommendations and proposals to shape structures and environments of the lower level 
institutions. Governance structures including organizational fields and the organizations 
themselves are the next level of Scott's (2001) framework. Organizational field consists of 
organizations in the same arena on the basis of similar services provided or other common 
characteristics as well as influencing partners such as bankers. Each organization's behaviour 
influences or is influenced by others. For example, a poorly governed company may elect to 
adopt the practices of another company if it perceives the latter to be a successful and socially 
acceptable organisation. At the last level of the framework are groups of individuals and actors 
(including accounting bodies and professionals) who are the ‘recipients’ of the higher-order 
pressures to conform to institutional norms whilst also seeking to negotiate and influence the 
diffusion of these norms.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that these long-term interactions within an 
institutional environment lead to increased similarities in norms and practices across different 
institutional contexts (isomorphism) through three ‘circuits’, namely coercive isomorphism, 
mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism. Admittedly, these three classifications of 
isomorphic pressures are not always empirically distinct. They intermingle in empirical 
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settings, but since each pressure drives, and is driven by, different conditions, it is possible that 
these can lead to different outcomes. 
3.2 Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism is the result of both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent (DiMaggio and Powel, 
1983, p. 150). Coercive isomorphism is premised on a financial and technical dependency that 
makes organizations subject to the demands of resource suppliers. That is, higher institutions 
can exert pressure on lower institutions due to the latter’s dependence on higher institutions for 
support (Mir and Rahaman, 2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In this regard, International 
Financial Institutions (IFI) require developing countries to implement reforms and/or fulfil 
conditions to be eligible for funding (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007; Wyatt 1997). Arguably, this 
higher financial dependency between these IFI and African countries creates a ‘conditionality’ 
for IFI to exert pressure on the adoption of standards such as IFRS, as was reported in the case 
of Ghana (Assenso et al., 2011). The WB loan or grant usually requires countries to reduce 
budget deficits, restructure foreign debts, devalue the currency, in the longer-term privatize 
state-owned companies, and implement anti-corruption and market liberalization laws (World 
Bank, 2005). Previous accounting research has also shown how IFIs influence the nature and 
operation of accounting practices in developing countries (Hopper et al., 2017) and in Africa 
(Rahaman, 2010). In this regard, authors such as Efobi (2015) and Nnadi (2012) reported that 
there have been increasingly persistent attempts by IFIs to press for the adoption of IFRS in 
developing countries (see also Hassan, Rankin, & Lu, 2014; Tyrrall, Woodward, & 
Rakhimbekova, 2007; Touron, 2005).  
 A key historical juncture underlying this persistence, and which is often referred to in 
the literature, is the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (Chua and Taylor, 2008; Alon and 
Dwyer, 2014). The crisis and its aftermath revealed the interconnectedness of financial, 
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banking and economic systems across developed and developing countries due to the quasi-
free circulation of financial flows worldwide. A domestic crisis in a country with weak 
governance, accounting and/or regulatory structures could thus spread rapidly to other 
countries and create regional and international financial instability. Since the WB and the IMF 
are in effect tasked to support countries in times of crises, a determined and strategic approach 
was put in effect to strengthen accounting, governance and regulatory systems worldwide, with 
a particular emphasis on developing countries (Mir and Rahaman, 2005). A few transnational 
governing bodies and associations also emerged as powerful supporters of the WB/IMF 
initiatives, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), International Organizations of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This renewed emphasis by WB/IMF, 
supported by these organizations, precipitated efforts to diffuse a common set of financial and 
regulatory standards1 including IFRS (Chua and Taylor, 2008; Alon & Dwyer, 2014).  
 A crucial mechanism underlying this coercive circuit has been the Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) program jointly run by the WB and IMF. First 
launched in 1991, the Accounting and Auditing (AA) assessments investigated the accounting, 
auditing and regulatory framework of a given jurisdiction and also reviewed a sample of  
financial statements of local companies, which concluded with an evaluation and 
recommendations. Almost 200 assessments and reports (twice for some countries) were carried 
out followed by regular discussions with countries, inclusive of the need to engage with IFRS. 
For instance, Zori (2015) claims that the 2004 ROSC (AA) on Ghana and Nigeria was the 
trigger for the two countries’ IFRS adoption in 2007 and 2012 respectively. Although the 
                                                          
1 For example, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs), Principles of Corporate Governance,  Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Standard,  Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies. In total, 




ROSC reports only provide recommendations, the WB and IMF do rely on the latter to underpin 
discussions with countries and as the dominant transnational players, they seek to establish a 
commonly understood societal framework for behavior (Alon and Dywer, 2016). In addition 
to the fact that countries in need of financial assistance might be expected to adhere to the 
relevant conditions to secure financial assistance and adopt IFRS accordingly, the neo-
institutional perspective suggests that nation-states that have been subjected to a scrutiny of 
their accounting and auditing systems (ROSC reports) would be more likely concerned about 
the state of their legitimacy vis-à-vis the transnational institutional environment. We therefore 
formulate the following hypothesis in respect to coercive pressures from international financial 
institutions: 
H1: The likelihood of a country’s IFRS adoption is associated with the existence of external 
pressure from international financial institutions to conform to globally legitimized models of 
accounting systems. 
3.3.  Mimetic isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 152) explained that mimetic isomorphism arises 
because “organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that 
they perceive to be more legitimate or successful.” Organizations (and nations) that do not have 
defined policies of their own are more likely to import existing institutionalized policies, 
mainly as a result of availability, certainty, and low cost. Mir and Rahaman (2005) argued that 
that the reliance on ‘off-the-shelf practices is a common mode of diffusion of international 
practices among developing countries. In this context, the role of global audit firms and their 
affiliated networks/firms in developing countries has been highlighted as a significant factor in 
translating and communicating the benefits of IFRS to a wider constituency of policymakers, 
regulators and companies at the national level. Although global audit firms do not have the 
power to enforce any set of accounting standards on a country, they rely on the prominence 
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and expertise of their professionals and their involvement in the accounting and audit of listed 
companies to advocate IFRS as a route to adopting high-quality accounting standards (Assenso 
et al., 2011). On a related point, Chua and Taylor (2008) mention how global audit firms 
advocated IFRS as a way to facilitate the financial reporting requirements for multinational 
firms and this gradually led to a situation where the global audit firms portrayed IFRS as the 
most appropriate set of accounting standards for domestic listed companies. This reinforced 
the global firms’ (and their national affiliates/networks) own market dominance due to their 
existing expertise on IFRS implementation and audit. In this respect, Albu et al. (2011) claimed 
that in Romania, the Big Four firm’s drive for globalized accounting standards was a source of 
pressure on Romania to adopt IFRS. In a similar vein, Joshi et al. (2008) highlighted the 
influential role of the Big Four in Bahrain’s adoption of IFRS. Furthermore, Ben Othman and 
Kossentini (2015) demonstrated that the presence of the Big Four audit firms was positively 
and significantly to IFRS adoption in emerging economies. In effect, the presence of global 
audit firms in the national context signals the extent of country’s integration with the global 
accounting community and in turn, this leads to a diffusion of ‘international’ norms of 
behaviour. Respectively in the case of Egypt and France, Hassan (2008) and Touron (2005) 
concurred that there was a strong impetus by local bodies and practitioners to mimic the global 
audit firms and adopt international standards in a bid to be seen as more ‘relevant’ and 
‘professional’.    
The role of global audit firms in contributing to the mimetic pressures to adopt IFRS is 
supported by other transnational professional organizations and institutions (Chua and Taylor, 
2008). In particular, IFAC has gradually positioned itself as key transnational professional 
agency not only in terms of the rapid development of the International Standards on Auditing 
(ISAs) (Humphrey et al., 2009; Boolaky and Soobaroyen, 2017; Boolaky, Ghattas, Marnet and 
Soobaroyen, 2020) but also in terms of taking the lead on a number of initiatives relating to the 
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establishing of an International Accounting Education Standards Board (McPeak et al., 2012) 
and a model code of ethics for professional accountants (Clements et al., 2009). In this way, 
IFAC aims to institutionalize a set of norms and ‘best practices’ in terms of how national 
professional accounting organizations might seek to define or conceptualize the various aspects 
and dimensions of ‘professional accountancy’. As an institutional member of IFAC, a national 
organization would rely on these pronouncements and guidance documents to ensure they 
operate in line with international norms. In this respect, professional accounting bodies seeking 
legitimacy, influence and recognition on the global stage are more likely to adhere to IFAC’s 
expectations and place more emphasis on international accounting standards than local 
accounting standards. As in the case of the global audit firms, IFAC does not have any direct 
authority to influence the adoption of accounting standards of a country. However, affiliation 
to IFAC leads to influence in terms of the local professional accounting community being more 
aware of the practices being adopted by other national accounting associations and thereby for 
it to consider appropriate to adopt the same practices. Following Judge et al. (2010), we 
therefore hypothesize the relationship between mimetic pressures and IFRS adoption in this 
form: 
H2: The likelihood of a country’s IFRS adoption is associated with the extent to which it is 
integrated within the global accounting community. 
3.1.3. Normative isomorphism. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contend that normative isomorphism arises from the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their 
work and to control the production of their products/services. These collective struggles and 
values help the organization to derive legitimacy from their occupational autonomy and 
expertise (Larson, 1977). Thus, normative isomorphism stems from a professionalization 
process whereby a form of ‘professional monopoly’ is “facilitated through jurisdictional claims 
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which focus on the content, control, and differentiation of work” (Sian, 2006, p. 296). The 
accounting profession in many countries has been particularly successful in ensuring that this 
monopoly in the provision of ‘qualified accountant’ services is maintained through the use of 
credentials, examinations, and/or registration that are typically endorsed by the State (Birkett 
and Evans, 2005). In this way, accounting education, including professional training, is able to 
exert influence towards the standardization of accounting practices (and accounting standards) 
among organizations within the same field (Hassan, 2008).  
Hegarty, Gielen, and Barros (2004) asserted that the adoption of IFRS would require a 
minimum level in terms of the educational system and a relatively large number of qualified 
professionals. In this regard, Judge et al. (2010), Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) and Ritsumeikan  
(2011) found a strong positive and significant association between educational levels and IFRS 
adoption. Furthermore, several authors have argued that qualified accounting professionals, as 
well as professional training, are key ingredients for effective implementation of IFRS in 
developing countries (Phuong & Nguyen, 2012; Muniandy and Ali, 2012; Albu et al., 2011; 
Perumpal et al., 2009). Zeghal and Mhedhbi argued that the adoption of IFRS requires a high 
level of education, competence, and expertise, to be able to understand, interpret, and make use 
of the standards. However, according to several ROSC reports, accounting education at the 
secondary and university levels in Africa remains insufficient or inexistent (ROSC, 2004-2015) 
and in the case of many developing countries that have decided to adopt IFRS, there appears 
to be little in the way of a coherent and national programme of professional development to 
underpin IFRS implementation (Hassan et al., 2014; Nurunnabi, 2015; Hopper et al., 2017).  
Our contention is that the level of accounting education is closely related to the standing 
and competence of national professional accounting organizations (PAO) (Al-Akra et al. 2009, 
Assenso et al. 2011). The ROSC reports (ROSC, 2004-2015) have often highlighted the 
absence of a functioning local PAO in African developing countries and the situation that many 
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qualified accountants are members of overseas accountancy bodies (e.g. Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants, Institute of Chartered Accountants of England & Wales); 
hence not technically and directly accountable to local settings. In such situations, the ROSC 
reports have typically recommended the setting up or strengthening of the local PAOs in many 
African countries to handle examinations, professional development/accreditation, 
ethics/disciplinary procedures as well as registration of local accounting firms and 
professionals. According to Al-Akra et al. (2009), the accountancy profession is crucial for the 
development of financial reporting and auditing practices and their existence and capabilities 
are integral to the adoption of IFRS. PAOs can also be considered to have higher levels of 
influence and structuring if they can operate their professional certification qualifications and 
Following Judge et al. (2010) we hypothesize for the relationship between normative pressures 
and IFRS adoption as follows:  
H3; The likelihood of a country’s IFRS adoption is associated with the level of 
professionalization at the local level. 
4.0. Data and Methodology. 
The sample consists of all 54 African Union-recognized countries between 2010 and 2015. We 
obtain data from World Economic Forum, World Development Indicators, the World Bank 
ROSC website, iasplus.com, IFRS.org, PWC, IFAC membership profile, OECD statistics, and 
African countries’ PAO websites. Our dataset yielded 270 observations. 
4.1. Measurement of Variables   
Countries adoption status (dependent variable-IFRS _AD); Although several studies (e.g. 
Hope et al., 2006; Judge et al., 2010; Alon and Dwyer, 2014) have used Deloitte’s iasplus.com 
as the common source of jurisdiction adoption status, we argue that using only Deloitte’s 
iasplus.com not only limits the classification but also appears to eliminate some countries from 
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the sample. Therefore this study draws from five different sources to generate a country’s 
adoption profile. Each source complements each other primarily because of the differences in 
the coverage of jurisdictions and helps to yield a comprehensive country profile. Admittedly, 
conflicting information about a country’s level of IFRS adoption does emerge. In this respect, 
Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) excluded countries such as Egypt due to discrepancies from 
different sources. Instead, this study followed the approach by Ramanna and Sletton (2014) in 
resolving conflicting information from different sources and applying a majority rule for 
countries that have conflicting information from these different sources. IFRS_AD was 
measured as binary variable; 1 = for adopted countries and 0 = non-adopted countries. We also 
extended the measurement on ordinal as 0 – countries that do not permit, 1 – countries that 
permit; 2 – countries that required by some companies; 3 – countries that required by all 
companies. 
Coercive score (COC): Resource providers such as IMF and WB use different means to exert 
pressures on nation-states including terms and conditions on loans and financial support; 
recommendations and advocacy activities. For the adoption of rules, prior studies have argued 
that the most effective source of coercive pressure originates from the inclusion of IFRS 
adoption in the terms and conditions and/or as part of ROSC recommendations (Judge et al. 
2010; Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015). Therefore, we construct a coercive score (COV) 
from the rankings on total commitments (TCC) from the IMF and WB and recommendations 
from the Report on Observance on Standard and Codes (ROSC). We used a percentile to rank 
countries on a scale of 0-3 based on the level of total commitments received. Country i is ranked 
0 if TCC <25th percentile; i = 1 if TCC>25th <50th ; i = 2, if TCC>50th <75th; i = 3 if TCC >75th 
<100th.  Rankings based on ROSC were as follows; ROSC on a scale of 0-3 where 0 – If ROSC 
was not issued in the country, 1- if ROSC was issued for the country, 2 – if ROSC 
recommended the development of accounting standards based on IFRS, 3 – if ROSC 
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recommended the adoption of IFRS. COV was estimated as the average of these 2 rankings per 
country. 
Mimetic score (MIM): The pressure to adopt practices by mimicking other organizations and 
nations on the global stage can be seen to originate from a variety of sources including FDI, 
the presence of multinational companies, membership in regional trading blocs, and the extent 
of import penetration (e.g. Judge et al., 2010). Insofar as accounting practices and standards 
are concerned, we contend that countries are more likely to be receptive from pronouncements 
and guidelines emanating from the global accounting community such as IFAC and 
international audit firms, particularly when these discourses are endorsed by a number of 
transnational governance bodies such as IOSCO, FSB and OECD. In this respect, we 
constructed a mimetic source (MIM) score from the average rankings of the number of 10 
international accounting firms (IAF) in a given African country and the number years the local 
PAO has been a member of IFAC. We used percentile to rank countries on scale of 0-3 as 
follows: Country i is ranked 0 if IFAC <25th percentile; i = 1 if IFAC>25th <50th ; i = 2, if 
IFAC>50th <75th; i = 3 if IFAC>75th <100th. Rankings based on international audit firms were 
as follows country i =0 if IAF is 0-1; i = 1 if IAF 2-4 i = 2, if IAF is 5-7; i = 3 if IAF is 8-10. 
Normative isomorphism (NOR): Accounting professionalism and the extent of a 
professionalization process are a function of the degree of a formal education (academic and 
professional) environment. Considering that IFRS is a relatively complex area of accounting 
practice, the level of professional training and professionalization would be a relevant indicator 
of its adoption. Therefore, we derived a normative score (NOM) by averaging the rankings on 
the number of qualified accountants (QA) and the strength of professional accounting 
organization (PAO). The strength of PAO is ranked on an ordinal scale of 0-if a country doesn’t 
have PAO, 1- if the country has PAO, 2- if the country has PAO which provides its professional 
qualification examination. Rankings based on number of qualified accountants (QA) were as 
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follows Country i is ranked 0 if QA <35th percentile; i = 1 if QA>35th <75th ; i = 2, if QA>75th 
<100th. 
Each of the three scores (COC, MIM, NOR) was scaled to 0-1 using this formula; scaled 
variable = (variable minus minimum)/(Maximum – minimum). 
Control variables: Based on prior studies, such as Boolaky and Sooborayen (2017), Ben 
Othman and Kossentini (2015), Judge et al. (2010) and Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) we control 
for economic growth with GDP growth rate (GR), trade openness with import penetration 
(IMPT), stock market development with market capitalization (MKC). We also controlled for 
the prevalence of foreign ownership (FOO) and colonialization (COL). Refer to Table 1.0 for 
the measurement of these variables. 
4.2. Empirical approach 
Since our dependent variable (IFRS-AD) is binary and can be extended to an ordinal scale, it is 
more appropriate to use logit and ordered logit models respectively2. To fit the logit model, we 
define IFRS adoption (IFRS-AD) as a binary variable of 0 and 1 to estimate. Next, we extend 
binary coding to an ordinal scale of 0-3, to apply an ordered logit regression model. 
We use our first equation (EQ1) to establish the association between the individual sources of 
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2 Following from prior studies (Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017; Ben Othman and Kossentini, 2015; Judge et al., 
2010; Ramanna and Sletton, 2014) we also run ordinary least square models and the un-tabulated results are 




Since institutional pressures flow from different sources, we run the second equation EQ2 







See Table 1.0 for variable description. 
Insert Table 1.0. Variable description and sources of data and expected signs. 
 
5.0. Results and Discussions. 
5.1. Descriptive statistics. 
The descriptive statistics on the variables are reported in Table 2 (categorical variables) 
and 3 (continuous). From Table 2, and as of 2015, only 18 African countries have mandated 
IFRS for all listed and large companies, while 25 countries have not committed to the use of 
IFRS. Six countries only require some companies to use IFRS and only 5 countries allow 
voluntary adoption of IFRS. Most of the IFRS-adopted countries are former British colonies, 
whereas the bulk of the non-IFRS counties are former French colonies. There are Report on 
Observance of Standards and Codes - Accounting and Auditing (ROSC) reports on 35 African 
countries. Of these reports, 12 countries were recommended to improve their own local 
standards, whereas 22 countries were recommended to adopt IFRS and one country was 
recommended to improve their existing standards in line with IFRS. Hence, it is somewhat 
consistent that 18 African countries have mandated IFRS, as of 2015. 
A review of Professional Accounting Organisation (PAO) indicates that out of the 54 
countries, 42 have a recognized PAO. However, only 13 of them organized their professional 
qualification examinations. There was an average of 3,475 accountants per country (Table 3), 
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with a high standard deviation of 12,237, minimum of 10 and a maximum of 67,890, shows 
that some countries do have a significant shortage of accountants. Even in countries such as 
South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana, which do have a relatively high number of accountants, the 
numbers on a per capita basis are still insufficient to meet accounting needs. As of 2015, 22 
African countries were full members of International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), with 
South Africa having the longest membership of 38 years. Finally, and although global 
accounting firms operate in a large number of countries worldwide, some of the top 10 global 
accounting firms do not operate in some African countries (e.g. Eritrea, Sudan) 
Insert Table 2.0 Descriptive statistics of categorical variables. 
Insert Table 3.0. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables. 
We present the Person Pairwise correlation results in Table 4. All the variables of 
interest have a significant positive association with IFRS adoption status. The correlation 
among the variables is less than 0.80, thus not signaling multi-collinearity issues (Field, 2000; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Insert Table 4. Pairwise correlation between variables.  
5.2. Country-level regression results. 
Table 5.0 reports the results for the logit and ordered logit regression estimates, hence testing 
the three hypotheses on the different institutional pressures associated with IFRS adoption. In 
M1 we explore the relationship between the individual sources of institutional pressures and a 
country’s IFRS adoption decision. M2 provides the results for EQ2 whereby the different types 
of isomorphism are proxy by a score constructed from the individual sources of institutional 
pressures. 
The results in M1 show that the different sources of institutional pressures are 
significant in their association with a country's IFRS adoption status except for the level of total 
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commitment (TCC). Specifically, the coefficient of 0.446 at 1% significant for ROSC indicates 
that countries that received a recommendation from the IMF and World Bank to adopt IFRS 
are more likely to adopt IFRS than other countries. It, therefore, includes those countries that 
are engaging towards IFRS adoption as a result of a coercive pressure implied in the ROSC 
report. We also report a non-significant relationship between TCC and IFRS adoption. This 
can be interpreted by the point that a direct link between grants/loan and conditionality (such 
as adopting better governance and accountability regimes) have become less prevalent in 
WB/IMF policies (Hopper et al., 2017) given the emphasis of the financial support aimed 
directly at key issues such as poverty reduction, health, and education. Instead the emphasis of 
international institutions, including by WB and IMF, seem to be focused on developing and 
strengthening a global regime of economic, financial and governance standards, via the use of 
ROSC reports/assessments as a form of ‘disciplining’ mechanism (Chua and Taylor, 2008).  
Although TCC is not significant in its own right, the COC coefficient, which represents the 
combined sources of external pressure, does support our first hypothesis that coercive pressures 
are significantly associated with IFRS adoption. In econometric terms, the coefficient of 1.934 
for COC suggests that one standard deviation increase in the score of coercive pressure leads 
to a 0.6114 increase in the likelihood of a country’s adoption of IFRS (1.934*0.3147).  
Regarding mimetic pressure, the coefficient of both variables of interest 0.551(IAF) and 0.030 
(IFAC) are statistically significant determinants of IFRS adoption at a p-value of <0.01. The 
results from the mimetic score (MIM) in M2 show that combined pressure from both IAF and 
IFAC is positive and significantly associated with IFRS adoption. Specifically, in economic 
terms, the coefficient of 2.557 at 1% significant level on MIM suggests that one standard 
deviation increase in mimetic pressure increases the likelihood of a country adopting IFRS by 
0.8765 (2.557*0.3428). These results support our hypothesis that African countries are more 
likely to engage with IFRS and international best practices as a result of a motivation to mimic 
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practices endorsed, and implemented, by the transnational accounting agencies and firms, 
namely IFAC and global audit firms. The results suggest that countries that host more IAF are 
more likely to adopt IFRS because of the IAF’s ability (expertise and resources) to engage at a 
practical level with policymakers, civil society and industry leaders on the benefits of applying 
international standards. Opinion leaders within these sectors (e.g. politicians, company 
directors, regulators, investor associations, chamber of commerce) can be sensitized on the 
logic of relying on off-the-shelf, socially acceptable and legitimate practices, thereby 
influencing relevant government authorities to consider mandating IFRS. The status of IAF, 
particularly in their role as auditors or offering professional services to listed companies, 
ensures that often their message is taken authoritatively. In a similar vein, IFAC’s active 
engagement with its regular statement of membership obligations (SMO) process has 
established a regular and transparent benchmark on the status of all IFAC member 
organizations when it comes to the adoption of standards and norms recommended by IFAC 
and/or other transnational institutions. Therefore, the longer a country has been an IFAC 
member and is therefore cognisant of the norms of its membership, the more likely it will be 
influenced to promote the adoption of IFRS (relative to new entrants). 
The results on the strength of professional accounting organization (PAO) and number of 
qualified accountants (QA) as a source of normative pressure support our third hypothesis. The 
positive and significant coefficient of PAO (0.908 @ 1%) and QA (0.071 @ 1%) indicates that 
the level of accounting professionalism and professionalization play a key role in a country’s 
IFRS adoption decision. This is also evidenced in the positive significant coefficient of the 
normative score (NOR = 2.252 @ 1%). To put it in an econometric perspective, one standard 
deviation increase in NOR leads to 0.77198 likelihood of a country adopting IFRS. Put 
differently the probability of a country adopting IFRS increases with the level of accounting 
professionalism in terms of the number of accountants and strength of the local accounting 
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organization. Our findings indicate that PAO that provides regular training to members have 
continuous engagement with members and hence is more able to influence the profession and 
opinion in relation to IFRS. 
To assess the robustness of our inferences with respect to the association between the extent of 
IFRS adoption and the hypothesized institutional pressures, we estimate both EQ1 and EQ2 
using ordered logit regression. The dependent variable IFRS_AD is measured on an ordinal 
scale of 0-3. The results are present in M3 and M4 of Table 5. Overall, these results are not 
qualitatively different from that of the logit regression in M1 and M2. Hence, we reach the 
same inferences as those discussed on M1 and M2 from Table 5. 
Most control variables revealed expected signs in predicting a country's IFRS adoption status. 
The coefficient of colonial history (COL=4.334) is positive and significant at 5% or less in all 
the models. Thus, ex-British colonies have a higher propensity to adopt IFRS compared to 
other countries in Africa (predominantly those previously colonized by France). The 
prevalence of foreign ownership is not deemed significant. One possible inference is that most 
foreign companies tend to report according to their home country’s standards, which might not 
be IFRS. For instance, Canadian companies in Namibia report per Canadian GAAP (e.g., 
B2Gold, Merencia), Australian companies report as per Australian GAAP (e.g., Bannerman) 
and U. S. companies report per US GAAP (e.g., Anglo-American company). 
 
Insert Table 5. Country-level regression results.  
 
5.3. Comparison with prior studies. 
In this section, we elaborate on how our study generates unique evidence on Africa as 
compared to the two prominent studies on IFRS adoption, namely by Judge et al. (2010) and 
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Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015), which both included African countries in their dataset. To 
ensure an accurate comparison to these prior studies, we distinctively reconstructed the data 
used in those studies with a focus on African countries. Accordingly, the variables and period 
used in the comparative analysis are as similar as possible to data used in their respective 
original studies. Appendix B provides an extract describing variables used and reported by 
Judge et al. (2010) and Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015). It has to be noted that the analysis 
by Judge et al. (2010) was cross-sectional while Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) used a 
pooled-regression approach. We also collected data on our variables: recommendations from 
ROSC, the number of international audit firms-IAF and the strength of professional accounting 
organization—PAO for the same period as covered by these studies. 
The results are presented in Table 6. Models 5–7 contain results of cross-sectional data 
using 2008 as the adoption year and averages as in Judge et al. (2010). M5 contains results 
using our variables, whereas M6 contains the variables of Judge et al (2010). M7 contains 
results using our variables and that of Judge et al. (2010). Whereas all our variables (COC, 
MIM, and NOR) in M5 are significant at 1% and 5%, none of the Judge et al. (2010) variables 
in M6 are significant except for foreign aid (FORAID) - which is significant at 5% but 
negatively associated to IFRS adoption. M7 confirms the significant power of our variables as 
compared with Judge et al. 2010 in a single regression equation (Pseudo R2 of 
M7;0.4965>M6;0.1442). Arguably, therefore, countries at different levels of development (in 
our case, from the African continent) exhibit different characteristics and differences in terms 
of the circuits and source of isomorphic pressures. Hence, the neo-institutional theory-inspired 
findings drawn from a mix of developed and developing countries are not easily transposed to 
the African context. For instance, most developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, have a high level of secondary school enrolment and low import penetration 
compared with most African countries, which have low secondary school enrolment but high 
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import penetration. Furthermore, developed countries tend to be donors of foreign aid while 
Africa is a net recipient of foreign aid. In effect, the sources of isomorphic pressures outlined 
by Judge et al. (2010) are at extreme opposite ends for the sampled countries. 
Models 8–10 of Table 6 contain results of pool-data data from 2005–2010. M8 contains 
results using our variables and M9 the variables used by Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015). 
M9 contains results using our variables and that of Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) in a 
single regression. 
We found that all our variables COC, MIM and NOR in M8 are significant at 1% and 
5%, with only the mimetic variable (BIGTRFF) by Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) being 
significant at 10%. Apart from the differences in the significance levels and direction of the 
coefficients, our variables provide high explanatory power than that of prior studies as evidence 
in the Pseudo R2. The Pseudo R2 of M8 is 56% (0.336-0.215) and hence higher than M9, and 
this even applies to the M10 single regression of M10.  Overall our comparative analyses in 
Table 6 showcase how our current study reveals institutional variables that are relevant and 
distinctive to the African context, which have been largely downplayed or ignored when relying 
on cross-continental/global research designs. In other words, our study provides a key 
contribution in providing empirical evidence of the specificity of neo-institutional variables 
and circuits driving IFRS adoption (or not) in Africa. 
Insert Table 6.0 Comparison with prior studies (using logit regression where IFRS 0 or 1 
5.4. Firm-level regression results3. 
In this section, and as part of underpinning the robustness of our main results, we also 
investigate the institutional pressures of voluntary IFRS adoption by a sample of firms in 
                                                          




African countries. Although there are few studies, such as Bassemir (2018), Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998), Francis et al. (2007), and Tarca (2004) on firm-level determinants, they 
focused on financial and economic factors and not on institutional pressures. Bassemir (2018) 
found that private German firms using IFRS are characterized by high growth opportunities, 
high international sales, high leverage, and high equity ownership. However, only a fraction of 
this sample relied on IFRS, implying that private firms do not expect a net gain from adopting 
IFRS. As most of the voluntary adopters are not listed companies, they are not expected to gain 
any net financial benefits from IFRS (Bassemir 2018). Hence, it would be fair to argue that 
their adoption would be driven by non-financial factors. 
We, therefore, operationalized sources of institutional pressure at the firm level using 
corporate governance structures as follows: Ownership type (OWT) as a proxy variable for 
coercive pressure. Francis et al. (2007) claimed that foreign-owned companies face further 
information asymmetry problems because it is costly for foreigners to get more information 
about the company relative to local investors. Consequently, foreign investors are likely to 
exert external pressures for companies to adopt global standards that will reduce information 
asymmetry. Also, if foreign investors provide much of the capital, they will tend to bring in 
their home countries' practices into the company. In this case, OWT is measured as a dummy 
variable with 1 = if the nationality of the majority owner of the firm is different from the place 
of domicile of the firm and 0, otherwise. 
Although the Big Four are not directly involved in the firm's decision-making process, 
they effectively can lobby firms to adopt global standards because of their experience 
(Bassemir, 2018) and the international network of IFRS experts. The Big Four firm also 
benefits from the firm’s adoption of IFRS because they can draw from their global network of 
firms to undertake audits for multinational companies in Africa at a relatively low cost 
compared to other competing firms. Hence the Big Four (BIG4) do exert mimetic pressure on 
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firms to adopt IFRS (Assenso et al., 2012). Big Four is a dummy variable of 1 = if the company 
is audited by Big Four or 0, otherwise. Lastly, Chartered Accountants on Board (CAB), in view 
of their professional affiliations, need to demonstrate high professional standards, inclusive of 
compliance with global standards. They are more hence likely to exert normative pressures on 
their firms to use IFRS. CAB is measured as the number of chartered accountants as a 
percentage of the total board size. 
We also considered financial data such as growth in revenue (RG), foreign sales (FR), 
leverage (LEV) and total assets (TAA). Financial variables were selected based on findings of 
Bassemir (2018) and Francis et al. (2007), and they are limited to companies where data was 
available.  We also included control variables such as company size with a board size (BS) and 
listing status (LS). We collected data from 220 African companies in countries that permit 
IFRS for the periods covering 2010-2015. The sample included both public and private 
companies. We admit that our measures of the institutional variables appear to be crude and 
hence, the results should be interpreted with caution. 
The results of the multi-period logit regressions, as presented in Table 7. M11 and M12 
examine the association of firm-level institutional pressures and IFRS adoption decisions. M11 
is a random effect and M12 is fixed effect regression model. The coefficients of the mode of 
firm-level institutional pressures are significant at 1% except for OWT. The results show that 
companies voluntarily adopting IFRS are characterized by a high number of chartered 
accountants on board. These results are consistent with the notion that IFRS is driven by 
normative pressures. Due to their professional qualifications and affiliations, chartered 
accountants are more likely to influence their companies to adopt IFRS for improving quality 
reporting. The coefficient of BIG4 is positive and significant as expected. Thus, firms that are 
audited by the Big Four are more likely to adopt IFRS indicating how the Big Four exerts some 
forms of memetic pressure on firms. 
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Against expectations, the insignificant coefficient of OWT implies that foreign-owned 
companies have a low propensity for adopting IFRS. The result is contrasted with Francis et 
al. (2007), who found a significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and IFRS 
adoption. We support our results with the argument that most of the foreign investors are from 
countries such as China, Canada, France, and the US, that are not necessarily enthusiastic about 
IFRS4. More importantly, as majority shareholders, they hold key positions and thereby having 
access to internal information. Hence, there may be no need for requesting quality external 
reporting. 
Next, in M13, we follow prior studies (Bassemir, 2018; Francis et al., 2007) to 
investigate the relationship between selected financial variables and the IFRS adoption decision 
of firms. The significant positive coefficient of both growth in revenue (RG) and leverage 
(LEV) implies that firms that require more financing have a greater propensity to adopt IFRS. 
This is consistent with the view that IFRS improve financing through a reduction in the cost of 
capital and information asymmetry (Barth et al., 2008; Mazzi et al., 2017). The insignificant 
coefficient of foreign sales (FR) corroborates with the results on foreign ownership (OWT). 
This is partly due to the fact most companies do not have high levels of foreign sales or few 
export trades to other African countries. 
We combine both institutional and financial variables in M14. All the variables remain 
statistically significant and in the same direction as highlighted in M12 and M13. Furthermore, 
the Pseudo R2 for M14 (0.693) is higher than both M12 and M13, although the number of 
observations is small. In sum, our analyses indicate that in addition to financial variables, 
                                                          
4 Relatedly, Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015) find that, contrary to several worldwide studies, that paradoxically 
IFRS adoption is negatively associated to FDI levels in African countries. The authors inferred that foreign 
investors might be concerned with the costs of operating and transparency implications of investing in African 
IFRS-adopting countries.  
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institutional pressures do directly influence companies to voluntarily adopt IFRS, especially if 
the company is private or unlisted. 
 
Insert Table 7. Regression results at the firm level. 
 
6.0. CONCLUSION 
Existing literature on IFRS has claimed that most countries, and in particular 
developing countries, adopt IFRS due to its substantive economic benefits, adoption by 
neighboring countries, and external pressures from IFIs in terms of loans and grants. However, 
our contention that these findings are not self-evident for the African context and many extant 
studies have not directly examined Africa as a specific region. For example, common 
institutional variables, such as foreign aid, import penetration, secondary education, and market 
capitalisation (Judge et al., 2010; Koning et al., 2018; Ben Othman & Kossentini, 2015; 
Ramman & Sletton, 2014; Stainbank, 2014; Zeghal and Mhedhbi, 2006), have been considered 
as explanatory variables but we contend that some of the indicators are at the extreme lower 
end of the spectrum for African countries relative to other countries. Furthermore, during the 
past decade, more than 70% of countries worldwide have required the use of IFRS, and yet 
only 38% of African countries have mandated IFRS. This different trend in adoption suggests 
that there may be different dynamics that pertain to the African case and this has motivated our 
study to analyze the specific driving forces behind IFRS adoption (or not) on the continent. 
Informed by the neo-institutional perspective and distinctively therefore, we investigated the 
relevance of specific institutional pressures on IFRS adoption in Africa, controlling for other 
variables used in the literature.  
Our findings reveal the relevance of coercive, mimetic, and normative, respectively in 
terms of the role of ROSC reports issued by the WB/IMF, the extent of the presence of 
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international audit firms (IAF), the length of IFAC membership, the number of local 
professional accountants and the degree of professionalization of the local professional 
accounting organizations (PAO). The nature of these pressures on IFRS in Africa is different 
from what has been reported in mainstream quantitative IFRS-adoption studies and supports 
some of the country-level (qualitative) insights on IFRS adoption in developing and emerging 
countries (e.g. Hassan, 2008; Hassan et al., 2014; Nurunnabi, 2015). Furthermore, as a part of 
our robustness analyses, we were able to highlight the specificity of our neo-institutional 
proxies in the African context relative to prior studies (e.g. Judge et al., 2010; Ben Othman and 
Kossentini 2015). 
Our findings provide a number of implications. Firstly, it chimes with Chua and 
Taylor’s (2008) critical claims about the rapid ‘rise and rise’ of IFRS adoption and the 
relevance of the social and political dimensions behind the ‘IFRS globalization’ project, in 
contrast to the mainstream economic motivations and discourses of foreign investment and 
stock market development. Such motivations and discourses appear to be merely symbolic and 
deployed as a way to justify prompt and rapid adoption. From this perspective, there are 
however lingering questions as to the speed at which African countries might be expected to 
adopt IFRS and the extent of these countries’ preparedness for adoption (assuming it is at all 
needed). Secondly, and from a policymaking perspective, the results do reveal the relevance of 
crucial circuits by which the case for adoption can be made. Our evidence also indicates the 
important role of local accountants and PAOs in IFRS adoption. Hence, transnational 
governance bodies, international financial institutions, and national governments need to first 
consider the need for robust and in-depth capacity building programs in accounting and 
enforcement expertise before proceeding towards IFRS adoption. One conjecture is that whilst 
IFRS adoption does appear to convey a strong legitimating signal for an African country and 
for its accounting community as a whole, the immediate benefits of such a rapid and 
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unsupported adoption would most likely flow, almost exclusively, to a relatively small group 
of local IAF representatives and affiliate entities of IFRS-complying multinationals. This 
implies that relatively little benefit would come to the wider accounting profession and for the 
vast majority of local companies, which in turn may negatively impact on a substantive, long-
term and in-depth national engagement with accounting standards.     
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Table 1.0 Variable description and sources of data. 
Determinants Variable.  Acronym Description Data Source Exp. Sign 
Dependent Country IFRS 
adoption 
status. 
IFRS A categorical variable measuring the level of IFRS 
adoption in a country.  
0 – not permitted, 1 - permitted; 2 – required by some 






          
Coercive 
  
Coercive score COC The average of  TCC  and ROSC rankings scaled to 0-1  Positive 
Total 
Commitments. 
TCC Total commitments disbursed by WB and IMF group to 
a country. Country i is ranked 0 if TCC <25th percentile; 
i = 1 if TCC>25th <50th ; i = 2, if TCC>50th <75th; i = 3 










ROSC The IMF & World Bank ROSC (AA) issued on the 
country. An ordinal variable of 0 – no ROSC on the 
country, 1 – ROSC issued on the country; 2 – ROSC 
recommended the development of accounting standard 
based on IFRS; 3 - ROSC recommended the adoption of 
IFRS. 
 ROSC website 
      
Mimetic 
  
Mimetic Score MIM The average of  IAF  and IFAC rankings scaled to 0-1  Positive 
International 
Audit Firms 
IAF Number of the top 10 International Accounting Firms in 
the country. Rankings based on international audit firms 
were as follows country i =0 if IAF is 0-1; i = 1 if IAF 







IFAC Number of years a country has been a member of IFAC. 
Up to 2015. Country i is ranked 0 if IFAC <25th 
percentile; i = 1 if IFAC>25th <50th ; i = 2, if IFAC>50th 
<75th; i = 3 if IFAC>75th <100th 
IFAC website 





NOR The average of  QA  and PAO rankings scaled to 0-1  Positive 
Qualified 
Accountants 
QA Number of Qualified Accountants per listed companies. 
Rankings based on number of qualified accountants 
(QA) were as follows Country i is ranked 0 if QA <35th 








PAO Measures the existence and strength of country PAO on 
the scale of 0-2, where 0-no PAO; 1- there is PAO but 
does not organize its professional examination; 2- PAO 












IMPT The ratio of import value to commodities sold as a 
proportion of the gross domestic product. 
WDI Positive 
  GDP growth 
rate 
GR Annual GDP growth rate. WDI Positive 
 Market 
capitalization 
MKC Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP WDI Positive 
 Foreign 
Ownership 






 Colonization COL Proxy for the colonial history of the country. 1 for all 





























Table 2.0 Descriptive statistics of categorical variables 
Variable Categories Frequency Mean Standard Err 
 
IFRS01 
Non-Adopter (0) 31  
0.3889 
0.0669 
Adopters (1) 23 0.0669 








Permitted 6 0.0487 
Required Some 5 0.0359 
Required All 18 0.0637 
     
 
ROSC 




To improve 12 0.0571 
To develop IFRS 1 0.0185 
To adopt IFRS 22 0.0675 
     
 
PAO 
No PAO 12  
1.0185 
0.0571 
PAO no Training 29 0.0684 
PAO & Training 13 0.0587 
Notes: IFRS01 – binary coding where 0 – if a country has not adopted IFRS. 1 – if the country has adopted IFRS. 
IFRS0123 – order of 0, 1, 2 3.  ‘0’= IFRS not permitted; ‘1’ IFRS permitted; ‘2’= IFRS required by some 
companies; ‘3’ = IFRS required by all companies. ROSC – Recommendations of ROSC (AA) reports. PAO – the 










Table 3. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev Min. Max 
COC 270 1.490 0.944 0 3 
MIM 270 1.166 1.032 0 3 
NOR 270 0.962 0.685 0 2 
TCC 270 3010.19 3173.866 30.75 13523.82 
IAF 270 4 3 0 10 
IFAC 270 9.6851 13.4302 0 38 
OA 270 3,475 12,237 10 67,890 
Notes: COC – Coercive score on an ordinal scale of 0-3. MIM-Mimetic score on an ordinal scale of 0-3. NOR – 
Normative score on an ordinal scale of 0-2. TCC - Total Commitments (in a million US$). IAF- Number of the 
top 10 International Audit Firms. IFAC- IFAC membership. QA - Number of Qualified Accountants. IMPT – 

















Table 4. Pairwise correlation between variables.  
Variable IFRS01 IFRS0123 TCC ROSC IAF IFAC QA PAO IMPT GR 
IFRS01 1.00          
IFRS0123 0.95*** 1.00         
TCC 0.16 0.22 1.00        
ROSC 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.40*** 1.00       
IAF 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.46*** 0.54*** 1.00      
IFAC 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.58*** 1.00     
QA 0.41** 0.29** 0.21 0.24* 0.43**** 0.55*** 1.00    
PAO 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.50*** 0.59*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.35** 1.00   
IMPT -0.02 -0.04 -0.47** -0.14 -0.0725 -0.08 -0.16 -0.21 1.00  
GDR 0.28** 0.37**** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.311** 0.23* 0.04 0.34** -0.05 1.00 
COL 0.657*** 0.725*** 0.469*** 0.518*** 0.405*** -0.053 -0.102 0.298 0.464 0.067 


















Table 5. Country-level regression results.  
  Main results  Robustness check 




















































































Constant  -9.076*** 
(-3.51) 
-11.45*** 
(-5.13)   
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs.  270 270 270 270 
Number 
countries  
 54 54 54 54 
Pseudo R2   0.6870 0.4158  0.4705 0.2562 
Notes: This table reports estimates of multi-period, logit and ordered logit models with time-varying covariates 
for the likelihood of adopting IFRS at country level for the full sample. Model 1 is logit regression and Model 2 
is ordered logit regression for the main results. Models 3 and 4 are is logit regression and Model 2 is ordered logit 
regression respectively for robustness check where COC, MIM, and NOR are scaled to 0-1. The models include 
all observations available from 2010 to 2015. Explanatory variables are measured contemporaneously with IFRS 
years, i.e. they are not lagged. For variable definitions, see Table 1. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Stars 




Table 6.0 Comparison with prior studies (using logit regression where IFRS 0 or 1) 
  Judge et al. 2010 study Kossentini &Othman 
Variables Isomorph. M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 



























      





















   
       
Kossentini & Othman 
2015 
      












        
Number of observations 54 54 54 324 324 324 
Number countries  54 54 54 54 54 54 
Pseudo - R2 0.3664 0.1442 0.4965 0.3360 0.2152 0.3915 
Notes: This Table reports the logit estimates of single period and multi-period with time-varying covariates for 
the likelihood of adopting IFRS at country level for different sample size and period in comparison to Judge et al. 
2010 and Kossentini & Othman (2015).  Models 5-7 contains results of cross-sectional data using 2008 as adoption 
year and averages as done in Judge et al. 2010. M5 contains results using our variables. M6 contains results using 
the Judge et al. variables. Model 7 contains results using our variables and that of Judge et al. (2010). Models 8 -
10 contain the results of pool-data data from 2005-2010. M8 contains results using our variables. M9 contain 
results using the Kossentini & Othman. variables. M10 contains results using our variables and that of Kossentini 
& Othman.  For variable definitions, see Table 1 and Table 8. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses Stars 



































































Time dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.451 0.523 0.693 
Observations 1,100 1,100 485 485 
Firms 220 220 97 97 
Notes: This table reports estimates of multi-period logit models with time-varying covariates for the likelihood of 
adopting IFRS for at firm level. Except for M11, all models are firm fixed-effects (FE) logit model. The models 
include all observations available from 2010 to 2015. Explanatory variables are measured contemporaneously 
with IFRS years, i.e. they are not lagged. OWT – Ownership type = 1 if the majority shareholder is foreign national 
or institution or 0 otherwise. BIG4 - 1 = if the company is audited by Big4 or 0, otherwise. CAB - the number of 
chartered accounts as a percentage of the total board size. BS – board size measured as number of directors. LS – 
1 if the firm is listed firm and 0 otherwise. RG – percentage growth in revenue. FR – percentage of sales from 
organization foreign countries. LEV – debt to capital ratio. TAA – Log of total assets.  Z-statistics and are presented 








Appendix A. IFRS adoption status of African countries. 
Required for all 
companies (3) 
Required for some 
companies (2) 
Permitted (1) Not permitted (0) 
Botswana 1 (2004) 
Ghana1 (2007) 









Sierra Leone1 (2009) 














































1. IFRS.org/use around the world. 
2. iasplus.com 
3. PWC- IFRS adoption by countries 
4. Other sources (ROSC (AA, IMF reports, articles Memos, etc) 













Appendix B. Description of variables used in prior studies 





It is computed as the average proportion of 
foreign aid relative to the gross domestic product 
during the 









Education (SECON) the enrolment in secondary schools as a percentage 
of the total population in the age group for 
secondary education in 2004. 




ROSC and foreign 
aid 
(FAROSC) 
Indicator proxy of ROSC reports 
foreign aid as a percentage of GDP 
Mimetic 
isomorphism 
Interaction of BIG4 
and Trade freedom 
(BIGTRFF) 
the number of BIG 4 offices over the population in 
millions. 
Trade freedom  
Normative 
isomorphism 
Interaction of IFAC 
and number of CPA 
over the population 
in million 
(QAIFAC) 
we include the indicator proxy of IFAC 
membership  
we consider the proxy of the number of CPA’s over 
population in millions as an indicator of accounting 
development. 
 
 
 
 
